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HE judiciary has struggled with competing policies behind labor
relations statutes for more than four decades.t At common law,
courts served as a potent deterrent to union activity. Employers
easily could obtain injunctions against strikes. In 1932, however, the pen-
dulum swung in favor of unions with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Section 4 of the Act' removes the jurisdiction of federal courts over
issuing restraining orders or injunctions, whether permanent or temporary,
in labor disputes. 2 The growth of union activity and the frequency of
strikes following Norris-LaGuardia prompted Congress to pass the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947. Section 301 of this Act 3 reintroduced the judicial
injunction to serve a policy of encouraging arbitration when contractual
disputes arose between employees and unions.
The evolution of labor law since the passage of these statutes has con-
cerned the critical question of whether and how to reconcile the conflicting
policies. The issue arises when the employer and union agree in a collec-
tively bargained contract to arbitrate all disputes relating to the contract in
return for the union's commitment not to strike when disputes covered by
the contract arise. If the union does strike over an arbitrable issue, or if the
employer refuses to arbitrate over an arbitrable issue, should courts refuse
to enjoin the breaching party pursuant to the nonintervention policy of
Norris-LaGuardia, or should courts order arbitration pursuant to the pol-
icy of Taft-Hartley? The Supreme Court determined in the landmark case
* B.S., Southwest Missouri State University; J.D., University of Missouri at Colum-
bia. Attorney at Law, Clark, West, Keller, Butler & Ellis, Dallas, Texas.
t Editor's Note: The Boys Markets injunction is once again before the Supreme
Court in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d
455 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1737, 68 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1981) (No. 80-1045),
involving the propriety of injunctions against strikes that might violate a no-strike clause.
The author of this Article argues in Part IV that the Buffalo Forge case, which refused an
injunction against sympathy strikes in the face of a no-strike clause, should be overruled.
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals now presents the Court with this opportunity.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
2. Id
3. Id § 185.
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of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 7704 that an injunction may be
permitted under certain circumstances. This Article discusses the judicial
grappling with this issue in detail, with an analysis of the early cases, the
Boys Markets decision, the criteria set forth in Boys Markets to obtain an
injunction, the union injunction to preserve the status quo, and procedural
requirements for obtaining an injunction.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
At common law, prior to 1933, union strikes could be thwarted with
relative ease by the employer's use of the injunction.5 Injunctions were
granted without substantial forethought, usually at ex parte hearings, if the
union activity was considered "tortious" and unjustifiable according to the
judge's assessment of the union's objectives and methods. 6 As a response
to considerable public dissatisfaction with lenient injunction standards,
Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 19327 to control the injunc-
tive powers of the federal district courts8 and to promote the "growth and
viability of labor organizations."9 Section 4 of the Act lists various labor
activities immune from federal court injunctions, including peaceful
strikes in connection with labor disputes.10
Five years after the passage of the Act, the number of strikes had in-
creased sixfold.' I The legislation also fostered a tremendous growth in
unionism.' 2 In response to this growth, Congress in 1947 passed the Taft-
Hartley Act,' 3 also known as the Labor-Management Relations Act, to
limit the power of unions.' 4 Section 301 of Taft-Hartley granted jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts over labor disputes without regard to the amount
in controversy or diversity of citizenship,15 and aided the bargaining pro-
cess by enforcing collective bargaining contracts under the rationale of
promoting industrial peace.16 One commentator viewed the Taft-Hartley
4. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
5. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
6. Report of Special Atkisson-Sinclair Committee, ABA LABOR RELATIONS LAW SEC-
TION-PROCEEDINGS 242 (1963).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
8. See 75 CONG. REC. 4510 (1932).
9. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976).
11. 19 L.R.R.M. 49 (1947).
12. A. Cox, LAW AND NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 12 (1960).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. Il1 1979).
14. Id § 151; see Note, Labor Law-Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers., The End
to the Erosion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1247 (1977). To avoid confu-
sion, this Article refers to the statute as the Taft-Hartley Act.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ...may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
Id
16. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
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Act as a "shift in Congressional emphasis away from the protection of
labor to the encouragement of the peaceful settlement of labor disputes
and the protection of contractual rights under collective bargaining agree-
ments."17 The passage of Taft-Hartley, together with the failure to repeal
any portion of Norris-LaGuardia, left potentially conflicting statutes alive:
the latter requiring federal courts not to interfere in labor disputes, and the
former permitting intervention.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills18 presented in 1957 the first op-
portunity for the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict. Lincoln Mills was
a union suit to compel employer arbitration of a grievance as required by
the collective agreement. The Court ordered the employer to arbitrate the
grievance as required by the contract, reasoning that the employer's agree-
ment to arbitrate was the quid pro quo of the union's no-strike agree-
ment.19 The scope of section 301 was thus viewed as not merely
jurisdictional, but also as a basis for affirmative relief from the violation of
provisions within a collective bargaining agreement. Although the ruling
clearly conflicted with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court side-stepped
the issue by relying upon cases permitting the specific performance of an
agreement to arbitrate pursuant to the Railway Labor Act.20 It found the
Taft-Hartley policy favoring the arbitration of disputes compelling, and
concluded that future section 301 suits would be governed by a federal
common law of labor relations "which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws."' 21 This body of law would determine
the rights and duties of parties to collective bargaining agreements.
The Steelworkers trilogy,22 decided by the Supreme Court in 1960, rein-
forced the Lincoln Mills statements concerning the national policy favoring
arbitration as a method of resolving disputes. These cases instruct courts
having jurisdiction over an arbitrated settlement not to investigate the
merits of a grievance award by the arbitrator unless no preexisting agree-
ment to arbitrate the dispute had been made. Under these conditions, the
arbitrator's order should be enforced without judicial inquiry into the pro-
priety of the actual award. In the Steelworkers trilogy the Court articu-
lated a presumption of arbitrability of labor disputes such that all doubts
concerning the application of arbitration clauses to particular disputes
should be resolved in favor of coverage.23 Providing a guideline for inter-
pretation of arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court said: "Apart from
matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the questions on which
the parties disagree must therefore come within the scope of the grievance
17. Note, supra note 14, at 1253.
18. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19. Id at 455.
20. See text accompanying notes 26-37 infra.
21. 353 U.S. at 456.
22. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
23. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960).
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and arbitration provisions of the collective agreement. The grievance pro-
cedure is, in other words, a part of the continuous collective bargaining
process.
'24
The Steelworkers trilogy and Lincoln Mills case concerned suits against
employers, and they established the importance of arbitration in our na-
tional labor policy. Not until later cases, however, was the issue of the
apparent conflict between Norris-LaGuardia and section 301 of Taft-Hart-
ley addressed. Before discussing these opinions, a look at the Court's
treatment of a similar conflict between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Railway Labor Act will be useful.
4. Accommodation Between Norris-LaGuardia and the
Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act was adopted in 1926 to protect railroad workers
from discharge due to union membership, and to prevent employer med-
dling in the organization of employees covered by the Act.25 Norris-La-
Guardia and the Act were first accommodated in 1937, ten years before the
enactment of Taft-Hartley, in Virginian Railway v. System Federation No.
40, Railway Employees.26 In this case the Supreme Court approved the
issuance of an injunction to require the defendant-railroad employer to
bargain with the plaintiff-union under the Railway Labor Act.27 The
Court granted the relief despite the employer's argument that Norris-La-
Guardia prohibited federal court injunctions in labor disputes.28 The
Court reasoned that the requirements of the Railway Labor Act could not
be superseded by the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.29 Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen30 followed Virginian Railway by
allowing an injunction to force a firemen's union to represent its members
without discrimination against Negroes as required by the Railway Labor
Act.31 The Supreme Court found nothing in Norris-LaGuardia that pro-
hibited it from enjoining a union under these circumstances and empha-
sized that any other decision would have left the union members without a
statutory remedy. 32
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Rail-
road33 the Court continued to chip away at the vitality of Norris-LaGuar-
dia by upholding an injunction against a strike involving a dispute subject
to final and binding arbitration. Chicago River required an accommoda-
tion of the Railway Labor Act and Norris-LaGuardia so that the purposes
24. Id at 581.
25. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937).
26. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
27. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976).
28. 300 U.S. at 562-63.
29. Id at 563.
30. 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
31. Id at 240.
32. Id at 239.
33. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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of both would be preserved. 34 The Court reasoned that the issuance of an
injunction did not violate the purpose of Norris-LaGuardia because the
injunction did not intrude on the merits of the case or "[strip] labor of its
primary weapon without substituting any reasonable alternative" 35-the
alternative being arbitration. Thus, Chicago River almost negated Norris-
LaGuardia where it conflicted with the Railway Labor Act. 36 Subsequent
cases followed the above results, although they altered somewhat the cir-
cumstances in which accommodation would occur. 37 The precedent set by
the accommodation of the Railway Labor Act with Norris-LaGuardia
greatly influenced the resolution of conflicts between Norris-LaGuardia
and section 301 of Taft-Hartley.
B. The Sinclair Decision
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson 38 offered the Supreme Court its first
opportunity to adopt the Chicago River reasoning and apply it to section
301 actions. Sinclair was an action by an employer to enjoin a union from
violating a no-strike clause and to compel arbitration of an underlying
grievance pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement. The action
was a result of nineteen months of work stoppages and nine strikes over
arbitrable grievances.39 The Court held that no injunction should issue,
rejecting the opportunity to adopt Chicago River and distinguishing that
case on the basis that the Railway Labor Act was a statutorily imposed
method of deciding disputes, while Sinclair dealt only with a method pre-
scribed within a collective bargaining agreement.4° The Court found the
language of section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia crystal clear4' as prohibiting
the use of injunctions despite the national policy favoring arbitration. The
Court distinguished Lincoln Mills as simply an action to compel the use of
arbitration; it was not an injunction against "work stoppages, peaceful
picketing or the nonfraudulent encouraging of those activities," 42 prohib-
ited by sections 4(a), (c), and (i) of Norris-LaGuardia. 43 The majority
would have allowed an order to arbitrate, but not an injunction against
strikes over arbitrable grievances due to the anti-injunction policy of Nor-
ris-LaGuardia.44
Justice Brennan sharply criticized the majority in his dissent,45 which
34. Id at 40.
35. Id at 41.
36. See Note, supra note 14, at 1251.
37. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1970)
(removes "reasonable alternative to striking" requirement); International Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (limited to situation in which injunctive remedy alone
could preserve plaintiff's right and there is reasonable alternative to striking available).
38. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
39. Id at 211.
40. Id
41. Id at 215.
42. Id at 212.
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104(a), (e), (i) (1976).
44. 370 U.S. at 213.
45. ld at 215.
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eventually had a significant impact on the accommodation controversy.
He argued that although section 301 of Taft-Hartley was not a repeal of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the courts had a duty to "seek out that accom-
modation of the two which will give the fullest possible effect to the central
purposes of both."' 46 Justice Brennan called for an accommodation of
Norris-LaGuardia similar to the one reached by Chicago River pertaining
to the Railway Labor Act.47 Responding to the majority's argument that
at the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments48 Congress considered and
rejected a repeal of section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, Justice Brennan found
an intent "at least as strong that Congress was content to rely upon the
courts to resolve any seeming conflicts between § 301 and § 4 as they arose
in the relatively manageable setting of particular cases."'49 He argued fur-
ther that even Norris-LaGuardia encourages the use of arbitration, calling
the majority decision a "crippling blow" to arbitration. 50 Employers, Jus-
tice Brennan predicted, would not be inclined to agree to arbitration
clauses if they could not gain relief when such clauses were defied.5'
Sinclair clearly undermined the arbitration process and the previous de-
cisions that national policy favored the use of arbitration to resolve labor
disputes. The Supreme Court removed the judicial teeth necessary to im-
plement those decisions, 52 making it very difficult to reconcile Chicago
River with Sinclair. The Court's distinction of statutory versus contractual
arbitration requirements did not change the national policy favoring arbi-
tration. Sinclair has been interpreted narrowly so as not to preclude en-
forcement of an arbitrator's decision after it was reached.53 Further, in
federal court an employer could be ordered to arbitrate, but employees
striking over an arbitrable grievance could not be ordered back to work.
By refusing to enforce union agreements not to strike, the courts were re-
moving the quid pro quo for the employer's agreement to arbitrate.54 Jus-
tice Brennan was correct. Employers would not be inclined to enter into
an agreement knowing they could not enforce a collectively bargained no-
strike clause.
Unable to enforce the no-strike clause in federal courts, employers
turned to state courts, where they were often successful. This was so at
least partially because of the Supreme Court holding in Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney 55 that section 301 did not preclude state court jurisdiction
to hear suits concerning enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
46. Id. at 216.
47. Id. at 218.
48. The Taft-Hartley amendments enacted § 301.
49. 370 U.S. at 223.
50. Id at 227.
51. Id (citing Norris-LaGuardia Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1976)).
52. Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills
to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REV. 32 (1969).
53. See, e.g., New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369,
371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 64 (1968).
54. See Note, supra note 14, at 1255.
55. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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Although in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 56 the Court required
state courts to apply federal law in these suits, the Court did not answer
whether Norris-LaGuardia limitations applied.5 7 Many state courts ig-
nored Norris-LaGuardia and issued injunctions pursuant to state law.58
Subsequently, in,4 vco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Associ-
ation ofMachinists59 the Court thwarted the employer's tactic of resorting
to the state courts by holding that state court actions were removable to
federal courts.60 Thus, the employer could acquire an injunction in a state
court only to have the union remove the action to federal court, which in
turn would be obliged to dissolve the injunction under the Sinclair inter-
pretation of Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley. This effectively left no
jurisdiction in the state courts and stripped the employer of any practical
means of enforcing a no-strike clause. A rethinking of Sinclair was in
order.6 '
II. THE Boys MARKETS CASE
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 77062 the Court reviewed
the Sinclair decision and in effect overruled it by sustaining an injunction
to restrain a strike over a contractually arbitrable grievance. 63 Boys Mar-
kets arose from a collective bargaining agreement providing that all dis-
putes concerning its "interpretation or application" be resolved by
arbitration and that during the term of the contract the union would not
engage in strikes, lockouts, picketing, or similar occurrences.64 A dispute
arose when management directed nonunion supervisory personnel to rear-
range merchandise in a frozen food case. The union's unsuccessful at-
tempt to replace the supervisors with union personnel precipitated a called
strike.65 Boys Markets was an appeal of a district court order enjoining the
strike, picketing, and "any attempts by the union to induce the employees
to strike or to refuse to perform their services."'66
The Court in Boys Markets called the Sinclair decision a "significant
departure" from their "otherwise consistent emphasis"67 of the national
policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration. It noted that as a result of
later cases, particularly Avco, the Sinclair decision did "not further but
rather frustrate[d realization" of this labor policy. 68 DowdBox 69 found a
56. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
57. The question was answered negatively in 1974 in William E. Arnold Co. v.
Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974).
58. Note, supra note 14, at 1256.
59. 390 U.S. 557 (1957).
60. Id at 560.
61. See Justice Stewart's concurrence inAvco, which suggested that the Court reconsid-
er Sinclair. Id at 562.
62. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
63. Id at 254-55.
64. Id at 238-39.
65. Id at 239.
66. Id at 240.
67. Id at 241.
68. Id
69. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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congressional intent in the enactment of section 301 of not disturbing, but
merely supplementing, the jurisdiction of states over disputes concerning
collective bargaining agreements. In Boys Markets, though, the Court said
this intent was clearly usurped by the removal of state court actions to
federal courts, where state injunctions would be dissolved. The removal
process was used for a "totally unintended function," ousting state courts
from jurisdiction in section 301 suits where injunctive relief was sought for
breach of a no-strike obligation.70
The Court also found Sinclair offensive to the federal policy of labor law
uniformity as stated in Lucas Flour.71 It recognized, however, that the
Boys Markets decision also would result in a certain disparity in results
among state and federal forums, but it viewed the injunction as "so impor-
tant a remedial device, particularly in the arbitration context" 72 that the
ability to obtain it in some courts but not others would "produce rampant
forum shopping and maneuvering from one court to another. ' 73 Such a
result would greatly frustrate any uniformity of law and the enforcement
of arbitration clauses.
The Court observed that a no-strike provision is the quid pro quo for an
employer's agreement to submit grievances to arbitration. 74 Without the
availability of an injunction to enforce the no-strike obligation, the em-
ployer's incentive to enter into arbitration agreements would be greatly
reduced, thus frustrating the policy of encouraging arbitration to reduce
industrial strife.75 Other remedial avenues open to the employer, includ-
ing actions for damages, were considered inadequate. In fact, the action
for damages "would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an
early resolution of the difficulties."'76 Sinclair frustrated the purpose of ar-
bitration: to "provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of in-
dustrial disputes. '77
Thus, Sinclair was overruled and the principles of the Sinclair dissent
were adopted. The Court required an accommodation between section 4
of Norris-LaGuardia and section 301 of Taft-Hartley to further national
policy. 78 It found the principles of Chicago River79 "equally applicable to
[Boys Markets].' '80 Although it articulated an abrupt change in the law,
the Court in Boys Markets characterized its holding as a narrow one, stat-
ing that an injunction would not issue in every case where a strike was
70. 398 U.S. at 244-45.
71. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
72. 398 U.S. at 246.
73. Id
74. Id at 248.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id at 249.
78. Id at 250.
79. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
80. 398 U.S. at 252. Also interesting is Justice Stewart's concurrence, which is basically
an apology for Sinclair. Id at 255.
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called over an arbitrable grievance. 8' Rather, the issuing court must first
find that the facts met several criteria, first stated in the Sinclair dissent
and specifically adopted by the Court in Boys Markets.82 Subsequent to
Boys Markets, these criteria have been the subject of many lower court
decisions; normally, each must be met before an injunction may issue.83
A. The Collective Bargaining Agreement Must Contain a Mandatory
Grievance and Arbitration Procedure and the Strike Must Be
Over a Grievance the Parties Are Contractually
Bound to Arbitrate
Whether the contract contains a mandatory grievance procedure appli-
cable to a particular grievance depends largely upon the language of the
particular contract. After Boys Markets, the question of how the particular
contract was to be interpreted still remained. Boys Markets had not an-
swered the question ,of whether the presumptions of arbitrability princi-
ples, set out in the Steelworkers trilogy, applied to Boys Markets cases as it
did to the other section 301 actions. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW 4 pro-
vided an affirmative answer.
In Gateway, a union struck over a safety dispute concerning the rein-
statement of two foremen who had been convicted of criminal falsification
of safety records. The employer sought a Boys Markets injunction against
the strike, asserting that the dispute was covered by a broad arbitration
clause in the collective bargaining agreement, even though the applicabil-
ity of that clause to safety disputes was questionable. 85 The trial court
granted the injunction, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that injunc-
tive relief was inappropriate where safety disputes were involved.86 Rely-
ing in part on section 502 of Taft-Hartley, 87 the Supreme Court
acknowledged a public policy "disfavoring compulsory arbitration of
safety disputes"88 but nonetheless reversed the circuit court, stating that
the Steelworkers trilogy applied to this case and to Boys Markets cases in
general.89 The Court pointed to section 203(d) of Taft-Hartley, 90 which
calls arbitration the "desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement." 9' The Court continued that in an ambiguous agree-
81. Id at 253-54.
82. Id at 254; see United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 320 F. Supp. 743, 746 (W.D. Pa.
1970).
83. United States v. Cunningham, 599 F.2d 120, 126 (6th Cir. 1979); Jackson Maritime
Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 571 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1978).
84. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
85. Id at 373.
86. 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
88. 414 U.S. at 373.
89. Id at 379.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
91. 414 U.S. at 377.
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ment, "doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 92 Thus, Gateway
held the Steelworkers trilogy presumption of arbitrability applicable to
Boys Markets cases.
Although this presumption is quite strong, in the following cases courts
refused injunctions on the basis of no sufficient underlying agreement.93
In Teledyne Wisconsin Motors v. Local 283, UAfW94 the Seventh Circuit
found a dispute not covered by an arbitration clause and denied injunctive
relief. No injunction was issued in Burke v. NaslandEngineering95 because
the contract had expired, and none in National Mine Service Co. v. Steel-
workers,96 in which the contract had been lawfully terminated by one of
the parties. In Baldwin Associates v. Teamsters97 a federal district court
denied an injunction on grounds that arbitration was not mandatory under
the agreement. 98 Apparently a mandatory grievance procedure without
binding arbitration as its final step will not support injunctive relief.99
Compare these cases to Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 295 ,I°° in
which a binding arbitration clause did exist, but the parties disputed the
existence of the contract itself. An injunction was issued.' 0 ' In Certified
Corp. v. Teamsters Local 996102 an injunction was granted even though an
oral extension of a written contract had occurred. Only where the arbitra-
tion clause clearly cannot be construed to cover the dispute will a court
refuse to compel arbitration.
B. The Collective Bargaining Agreement Must Contain a No-Strike
Clause, Express or Implied
Where the "no-strike" provision of the collective bargaining agreement
is clear on its face, no problem is present. A more difficult question arises
when the contract does not contain an express agreement not to strike. In
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 103 the Supreme Court sustained a
state court damage award to an employer for the breach of a provision
requiring arbitration of grievances, although no express no-strike clause
existed in the contract. The Court in Boys Markets cited Lucas Flour with
apparent approval;104 however, since Boys Markets was a case in which an
92. Id at 380 n.10 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 583 (1960)).
93. For a more exhaustive list of cases, see R. HOTVEDT, STRIKES, STOPPAGES, AND
BoYcoTrs 29-30 (1980).
94. 530 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1976).
95. 95 L.R.R.M. 2606 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
96. 510 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1975).
97. 101 L.R.R.M. 2685 (C.D. I11. 1979).
98. Id at 2686. See also Standard Food Prods. Corp. v. Brandenburg, 436 F.2d 964 (2d
Cir. 1970).
99. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324 (7th
Cir. 1972).
100. 449 F.2d 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1971).
101. 449 F.2d at 590.
102. 597 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
103. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
104. 398 U.S. at 248 n.16.
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express no-strike clause did exist, the question of whether a no-strike
clause would be implied by the courts where injunctive relief was sought
was left open.
In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWI 0 5 the Court held that a Boys Markets
injunction was proper even in the absence of an express no-strike clause,
reasoning that the principles of Lucas Flour were equally applicable to the
Boys Markets situation. °6 The Court noted that "a contractual commit-
ment to submit disagreements to final and binding arbitration gives rise to
an implied obligation not to strike over such disputes."' 0 7 It stated that
absent an expression of intent to the contrary, "the agreement to arbitrate
and the duty to not strike should be construed as having coterminus appli-
cation." 108 Therefore, after Gateway Coal the question becomes whether a
no-strike agreement was expressly excluded from the collective bargaining
agreement. If not, a court probably will find a no-strike obligation.
C. The Employer Should be Ordered to Arbitrate as a Condition of His
Obtaining an Injunction Against the Strike
In Boys Markets the Supreme Court stated the employer must be or-
dered to arbitrate as a condition of the granting of the injunction.1°9 The
Second Circuit in Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 295'1° ruled subse-
quently that a court must also find that both parties are required to arbi-
trate under the agreement. I ' The requirement that the employer be
compelled to arbitrate can become a troubling issue. In Chief Freight Lines
Co. v. Local 886112 a dispute occurred over the right to represent eight of
the employer's office employees. The employer refused to recognize the
union and the issue was submitted to arbitration; a decision was reached,
but the parties disagreed over the application of the decision. The union
threatened a strike, and the employer requested and was granted a Boys
Markets injunction. In the meantime, a rival union filed a representation
petition seeking to represent the same employees. The employer then
asked that the injunction order include a stay of arbitral proceedings in
view of the conflicting claims for representation. The Tenth Circuit held
that the injunction order was improper with the stay, as the order did not
require the employer to arbitrate as a condition of his obtaining the
injunction. "13
An attempt to require the employer to allege and prove its willingness to
arbitrate the issue in controversy was thwarted in Jacksonville Maritime
105. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
106. Id at 381.
107. Id
108. Id at 382.
109. 398 U.S. at 255.
110. 449 F.2d 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1971).
111. 449 F.2d at 591. This requirement will take on greater significance in the discussion
of the use of Boys Markets injunctions by unions. See text beginning with note 62 supra.
112. 514 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975).
113. Id at 581.
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Association v. International Longshoremen's Association Local 1408-A. 114
The Fifth Circuit in this case noted that this procedure was not specifically
required by Boys Markets and would "confuse issues," allowing "the very
conditions-work stoppage and circumvention of arbitration-that Boys
Markets sought to remedy."'" 5 Evidently, the issue of willingness to arbi-
trate must be raised defensively to become part of a case.' 1 6
D. A Breach of the No-Strike Requirement, Either Occurring or
Imminent, Must Exist
Normally, courts will require an actual strike before an injunction will
issue. Prospective injunctions, when a strike is imminent but not yet oc-
curring, raise more difficult questions. Where a pattern of illegal strikes or
similar activity has been demonstrated, most courts are inclined to issue an
injunction against future strikes.'17 For example, in Old Ben Coal Corp. v.
Local 1487, UMW" 8 the employer showed that the union had engaged in
a series of at least eleven illegal strikes over arbitral grievances, including
eight since the granting of a previous, more narrow injunction. The Sev-
enth Circuit, finding "no other avenues of relief," granted the prospective
injunction." 19 Not all circuits are in agreement that a prospective injunc-
tion may be issued, 2 0 nor are the ones that seem to allow issuance in
agreement as to the circumstances necessary for issuance.' 2' Nevertheless,
their attitude seems to be that, given the right set of circumstances, a pro-
spective injunction will issue. 22
E Traditional Equitable Principles Must Support
Issuance of the Injunction
The issues involved in this broad category spill over into those discussed
in the next two categories and will be more fully discussed there; however,
an "equitable principles" issue was discussed in Western Publishing Co. v.
Local 254, Graphic Arts International Union.123 In Western Publishing an
employer brought an action for damages under section 301 of Taft-Hart-
ley 12 4 against a union and certain of its officers and members for violation
114. 571 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1978).
115. Id at 324.
116. See Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1972).
117. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976); CF&I
Steel Corp. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974).
118. 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1974).
119. Id at 953.
120. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976); United
States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
121. See Latas Libby's, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 609 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1979), and
cases cited therein.
122. See Drummond Co. v. District 20, UMW, 598 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1979), in which the
Fifth Circuit left open the question of a "single subject" prospective injunction. In United
States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976),
the Fifth Circuit had disallowed a prospective injunction broader in scope.
123. 522 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
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of arbitration and no-strike clauses in their collective bargaining agree-
ment. A dispute developed over whether a certain job constituted struck
work, work transferred from another plant of the employer involved. Both
the union and the employer agreed that if it was struck work, the union
could refuse to do the work, as the struck work provision was an exception
to the no-strike clause. Further, they agreed that the issue was subject to
arbitration. 125 The employer argued that the union did not have the right
to strike until the issue was determined favorably by arbitration. The
union argued that to deny its right to refuse to work until the arbitration
process was completed was equivalent to "a destruction of that right"; 126 it
could not undo work already done while the arbitration process was pend-
ing. In addition, the union would not exercise its right for fear of a dam-
age award should it be wrong. The union reasoned that in order to
preserve the right to refuse to do the work it must be allowed to exercise
that right prior to the arbitral determination. 127
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the union's arguments, but called
them "misdirected," asserting that such arguments would be proper in a
Boys Markets injunction case, not a damage case. Consequently, the court
refused to evaluate them.128 Although it is a damages case, Western Pub-
lishing indicates the equitable considerations that would be appropriate
and that must be evaluated in each case, for it "does [not] follow. . . that
injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of course in every case of a
strike over an arbitrable grievance."'129 In this respect, Western Publishing
may provide an effective blueprint for future anti-injunction advocates.
One other case that has considered the balancing of equities problem is
National Rejectors Industries v. United Steelworkers.130  In National
Rejectors an employer's suspension 6f employees for violation of work
rules dropped plant production by thirty percent. The record noted that if
these conditions continued, the company could not perform existing con-
tracts and would lose future contracts. The district court granted an in-
junction, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that these
suspensions were the result of deliberate union attempts to break the rules
and disrupt the operations of the plant. 131
In contrast, the company went to considerable effort to keep the plant in
operation. It suspended the rules in an attempt to keep the work force
active. The fact that the company was at all times prepared to resolve the
disputes through arbitration was undisputed. The union offered no evi-
dence that it would be harmed by an injunction. Balancing the respective
equities, the Court found them greatly favoring the employer. 32
125. 522 F.2d at 530-32.




130. 562 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1977).
131. Id at 1077.
132. Id at 1077-78. Note that in this case, as in most others, the balancing of equities
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F The Activity Will Cause Irreparable Harm to the Employer
The irreparable harm requirement in Boys Markets was simply an indi-
cation by the Supreme Court that traditional equitable principles would be
applied in conjunction with the special requirements peculiar to Boys Mar-
kets injunctions. 133 One of the basic underlying principles of Boys Mar-
kets is that in these cases an action for damages under section 301 of Taft-
Hartley is inadequate to an employer who is losing the good will of the
business through the illegal activity of the union.' 34 The employer's dam-
ages are irreparable and difficult to measure. In addition, according to
Boys Markets, the damages action during or after a dispute would "tend to
aggravate industrial strife and delay in early resolution of the difficulties
between employer and union."'135
Given these judicial guidelines the employer seemingly can characterize
its particular fact situation to fit the Boys Markets "irreparable harm" re-
quirement quite easily. The employer need only allege the facts that will
show it is being damaged more than just monetarily, and that this damage
is both irreparable and difficult to measure. This situation is illustrated by
Panella v. Teamsters Local 150,136 in which an injunction was granted to
an employer upon a finding that a strike would interfere substantially with
the employer's ability to carry on its business and to retain customer good-
will. 137 An injunction also was granted in McNichol Co. v. Food Drivers
Local 500,138 as the court found that "continuation of the strike would
make it impossible for the employer to meet its contractual commit-
ments."' 139 In neither case were anything more than these broad and
"boiler plate" types of allegations required to obtain an injunction.
In General Building Contractors Association v. Local Unions 542, 542-A,
542-B, International Union of Operating Engineers140 a federal district
court found that the plaintiff-employer would lose $25,000 per day if a
work stoppage occurred. It also found that the "public likewise [would]
suffer irreparable injury"' 4 ' because the employer was a contractor in
charge of constructing a high rise building and six other projects. This
case is noteworthy in that it did not consider the question of whether the
$25,000 per day loss was in fact irreparable, and more importantly, that it
did consider the issue of irreparable harm to persons who were strangers to
the lawsuit. The case seems to illustrate that traditional broad equity prin-
ciples are quite alive in Boys Markets cases, and that the magnitude of the
requirement is closely akin to the irreparable harm and relative harm requirements in the
discussion of criteria 6 and 7.
133. See Note, Labor InJunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrabiity, 85
HARV. L. REV. 636 (1972).
134. See William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974).
135. 398 U.S. at 248.
136. 89 L.R.R.M. 2463 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
137. Id at 2463.
138. 88 L.R.R.M. 3349 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
139. Id at 3349.
140. 371 F. Supp. 1130 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
141. Id at 1136.
[Vol. 35
BOYS MARKETS INJUNCTIONS
loss bears directly upon whether the harm is characterized as irreparable.
This is not to say that the irreparable harm requirement is never a stum-
bling block in a Boys Markets case. In Postal Workers v. Bolger 42 the
union was granted an injunction by a federal district court to stop the em-
ployer's unilateral elimination of a shift and a transfer of employees pend-
ing resolution of the issue by arbitration. The Fourth Circuit vacated the
injunction on grounds that the union failed to make a sufficient showing of
irreparable harm.143 The court noted that the employees simply had been
reassigned within the same office, and that it would be a simple matter for
an arbitration award to return the parties to the status quo ante should the
union prevail. 44 Because no threat to the arbitration process was present,
in that the arbitrator's award could repair any harm done, no need for
"judicial intrusion" existed.' 45
G The Employer Will Suffer More Harm from the Denial of the
Injunction than Will the Union from Its Issuance
This requirement is another traditional equity principle retained in the
Boys Markets criteria. It again requires the courts to balance the equities
of a labor dispute. Normally this balancing will be relatively simple once
an employer shows irreparable harm. Examples are the McNichol'46 and
Panella147 cases in which the courts did not separate the "irreparable
harm" and "balancing of equities" problems. This is not always the case,
however.
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 633148 a dispute arose over
an employee rule prohibiting the wearing of "tank-tops" during working
hours. Those employees who refused to follow the rule were sent home.
As a result, more and more employees wore tank tops and were sent home
until a plant shutdown ensued. The employer sought a Boys Markets in-
junction prohibiting the wearing of tank tops and ending the plant shut-
down pending arbitration of the underlying dispute.
Although the dispute unquestionably was arbitrable, the First Circuit
vacated the federal district court's injunction by balancing the equities and
stating that a rule designed to stop the wearing of tank tops in areas seen
by persons touring the plant was hardly "the type of injury properly pro-
viding the basis for relief."' 149 Further, the court could not see any irrepa-
rable injury to the employer by the wearing of tank tops pending
arbitration. The court noted, however, that this was a limited ruling based
142. 104 L.R.R.M. 2341 (4th Cir. 1980).
143. Id at 2343.
144. Id
145. Id
146. McNichol Co. v. Food Drivers Local 500, 88 L.R.R.M. 3349 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
147. Panella v. Teamsters Local 150, 89 L.R.R.M. 2463 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
148. 511 F.2d 1097 (lst Cir. 1975).
149. Id at 1100.
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on the facts of the case,' 50 and stated that a different result might occur if
the employees refused to comply with a rule regarding a safety precaution,
or if the disregard of work rules seriously undermined the employer's abil-
ity to conduct business.15'
The Anheuser-Busch facts may be contrasted with those in National
Rejectors Industries v. United Steelworkers, 52 a work rules case in which
the employer was granted an injunction. The Eighth Circuit distinguished
Anheuser-Busch, noting that the employer had offered to suspend the rules
pending arbitration so that the disruptions caused by suspensions for viola-
tions of the rules would cease.153 This case thus indicates that conduct of
the parties prior to issuance will be one of the factors considered by the
courts when balancing the equities, a principle similar to the "clean hands"
doctrine.
H Likelihood of Success: An Additional Issue?
One issue, the genesis of which may be found in the application of tradi-
tional principles in Boys Markets cases, is whether the party seeking the
injunction must show a reasonable likelihood of success before the arbitra-
tor. In nonlabor cases, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court
is required to make an interim evaluation of the merits of the case to deter-
mine if a reasonable likelihood exists that the person seeking the injunc-
tion will prevail on the merits.' 54 The question, then, is whether this
requirement is carried over to Boys Markets cases.
Authority on this issue seems to be severely split. Transit Union Division
134 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound I) 155 indicates that a preliminary
showing of reasonable likelihood of success is not necessary in Boys Mar-
kets cases; the moving party need show only that the claims in arbitration
were not "plainly without merit."' 56 Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc. 157 however, in-
dicates that a showing of reasonable likelihood of success is required. Al-
though, at first glance, these cases appear to be at odds, they most probably
are not. As Judge Sneed attempted to explain in Greyhound I:
A reasonable interpretation is that "plainly without merit" is the neg-
ative form of a standard, the affirmative form of which is "some likeli-
hood of success." Under this view, Judge Friendly was merely
illustrating the standard "some likelihood of success" when he de-
scribed the inequity of issuing preliminary injunctions pending arbi-
150. Id (citing United Steelworkers v. Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc., 319 F.
Supp. 636, 640-4 (W.D. Pa. 1970)).
151. 511 F.2d at I100.
152. 562 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1977).
153. Id at 1077-78.
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 65; see Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc. 528 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir.
1975).
155. 529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 807
(1976), rev'd, 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1977).
156. 529 F.2d at 1077.
157. 491 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1974).
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tration which were "plainly without merit."' 58
So, the two tests are quite similar or, perhaps, the same.
Nonetheless, the issue continues to cause confusion in the courts. One
case, Teamsters Local 764 v. Branch Motor Express Co. '59 cites both Grey-
hound I and Hoh, and concludes that "some likelihood of success on the
merit of the dispute,"' 60 must exist and that this test may not be met by a
showing that the "position [plaintiff] will espouse in arbitration is suffi-
ciently sound to prevent arbitration from becoming a futile endeavor."'
6
'
Evidently, in Branch Motor the court viewed the "likelihood of success"
requirement as met by the showing of the "soundness" of the position of
the person requesting arbitration. Reasonable likelihood of success may
mean any likelihood of success under this standard.
Other courts have not taken this approach. Many require more than just
a showing of arbitrability of the underlying issue, instead requiring a
showing that the party seeking an injunction has a reasonable likelihood of
prevailing on the merits at the arbitration hearing.' 62 In Drivers Local 71
v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc. 163 the district court held a "mini-hearing" on
the merits, reminiscent of some early class action certification hearings, to
determine if the likelihood of success requirement was met. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit castigated the lower court for abusing its discretion. 
64
In any event, the problem of proving likelihood of success, however
treated by a court, is one that must be considered by the seekers of a Boys
Markets injunction.
The better result would be to require only the preliminary showing of
arbitrability to cut short frivolous claims or those using the arbitration pro-
cess as a pretext for obtaining an injunction. This would prevent arbitra-
tion from becoming a "futile endeavor." 65 A court cannot and should not
be called upon to assess the merits of labor disputes. This is left to the
arbitrator and is expressly withheld from courts by national labor policy as
expressed in Norris-LaGuardia. 166 The Supreme Court in both Boys Mar-
kets and Sinclair made no such assessment requirement, and none should
be read into their decisions. A court should make a finding as to whether
the dispute is "arguably arbitrable,"' 67 and look no further into the merits
of the case.
158. 529 F.2d at 1077.
159. 463 F. Supp. 282 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
160. Id at 288.
161. Id at 289.
162. See, e.g., Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430 F. Supp. 969
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
163. 582 F.2d 1338 (4th Cir. 1978).
164. Id at 1342.
165. Transit Union Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound I), 529 F.2d 1073,
1078 (9th Cir.), Yacated and remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), rev'd, 550 F.2d
1237 (9th Cir. 1977).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
167. Jacksonville Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1408-A,
424 F. Supp. 58 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
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III. THE UNION INJUNCTION TO PRESERVE THE STATUS Quo
The Boys Markets decision dealt with an attempt by an employer to
enjoin a union from striking in violation of a no-strike clause in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement when the underlying dispute was subject to ar-
bitration. The arbitration clause, whether coupled with an express or
implied no-strike clause, is viewed as the quid pro quo for the no-strike
clause: the union promises not to strike over certain grievances if the em-
ployer, in turn, allows the arbitration process to intrude upon his right to
manage his own affairs.' 68 But does it follow that the employer, by prom-
ising to arbitrate disputes, has agreed not to implement changes in com-
pany policy until the grievance process has resolved the dispute? Many
would argue that the employer has made no such agreement, and that to
enjoin him pending arbitration enforces a promise neither made by the
employer nor intended by either party.169
Opinions in two cases, known as Greyhound 1170 and Greyhound 11,171
illustrate this problem. In Greyhound I the Ninth Circuit considered the
appeal of an injunction restraining an employer from changing existing
employee work schedules. The court recognized the national policy favor-
/ing arbitration of disputes, but it desired to exercise some restraint in
granting injunctive relief by focusing upon "irreparable injury" as a signif-
icant requirement.172 Although it believed that injunctive suits would not
then be used to usurp the collective bargaining process judicially, the court
found the requisite irreparable injury and sustained the injunction: the
trial court's decision was not "clearly erroneous."' 73 If the interests of the
union (or the employees) are likely to suffer the requisite injury, or if the
arbitration process itself appears to be in danger, then the court will be
allowed to intrude in the dispute. Otherwise, the court will demur. In
other instances the retention of the status quo pending arbitration "may be
bargained for by the union and agreed to by the employer."' 174 Thus, the
parties may make it part of the collective bargaining agreement, but if they
fail to do so, Boys Markets will not provide the judicially imposed
equivalent.
Greyhound I was vacated and remanded for further consideration in
light of the Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers175 decision. In Grey-
hound!!, decided the following year, the Ninth Circuit revised its decision
and denied the status quo ante injunction. 176 It reasoned that the Buffalo
168. See Comment, In/unctions Restraining Employers Pending Arbitration: Equity and
Labor Policy, 82 DICK. L. REV. 487, 502-03 (1978).
169. Id at 503.
170. Transit Union Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), vacated
and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
171. Transit Union Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
172. 529 F.2d at 1079.
173. Id at 1078.
174. Id at 1079.
175. 428 U.S. 397 (1976); see text accompanying notes 215-27 infra.
176. 550 F.2d at 1239.
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Forge177 decision required a different analysis, and focused on the con-
tents of the labor agreement rather than the nature of the injury. In the
absence of an agreement not to strike, a union could not be enjoined from
striking. Consequently, in absence of an agreement to preserve the status
quo during arbitration, the employer could not be compelled to preserve
the status quo. In Greyhound 11 the court found no such express promise,
and because of Buffalo Forge, none would be implied. 178
The court in Greyhound I recognized the Gateway Coal holding that a
promise to submit a dispute to arbitration may justify an implied duty not
to strike, but it denied that this promise implied a duty to preserve the
status quo. 17 9 The court stated that the "source of this difference is that a
strike pending arbitration generally will frustrate and interfere with the
arbitration process while the employer's altering the status quo generally
will not."' 80 The court also stated, however, that "the implication of a
duty not to strike may be 'essential to carry out the promise to arbitrate
and to implement the private arrangements for the administration of the
contract.' "181 Ordinarily no corresponding necessity requires the implica-
tion of an agreement to preserve the status quo. If the employer's action is
wrong, the situation can be restored substantially to the status quo ante.
The court did not say that an agreement to remain at the status quo pend-
ing arbitration may not be implied in the proper case, but that case seems
to be one in which the arbitrator by his decision would not be able to
return the parties to the status quo ante.
The court calls the GreyhoundI! test more restrictive than that in Grey-
houndI, but this view may be superficial. To decide whether the status
quo ante can be preserved, one still must look to the nature and extent of
the injury caused by the employer's activity. If the activity causes irrepara-
ble harm, under Greyhound I! the status quo ante is not preserved and an
agreement may be implied. Clearly the Greyhound I test also is met. The
only distinction, then, most probably lies in the amount of harm required.
By its reversal in Greyhound !! the court seems to indicate it will require
more.
Subsequent to Greyhound II, courts have had a difficult time wrestling
with these concepts. In Lever Brothers v. Chemical Workers Local 217,182
decided prior to Greyhound II, the Fourth Circuit granted an injunction,
citing Greyhound !. After Greyhound H!, and on petition for rehearing, it
noted that Greyhound!! allowed for an "implied" promise to preserve the
status quo,' 83 but the court failed to analyze whether such a promise was
in fact implied. Rather, it argued that had the status quo not been pre-
177. Buffalo Forge was an injunction against a sympathy strike, in which the Court
found no express agreement not to strike over a sympathy strike.
178. 550 F.2d at 1239.
179. Id at 1238.
180. Id at 1239 (quoting Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 411).
181. 550 F.2d at 1239.
182. 554 F.2d 115, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1976).
183. Id at 122 n.12.
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served, the employer would have moved its plant permanently, causing
great harm to the union and making arbitration futile. 184 Thus, the court
paid lip service to Greyhound H, but failed to move beyond GreyhoundI's
relative harm analysis.
The Third Circuit in United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting 85
paid even less homage to the Greyhound I1 analysis. "The critical issue,"
according to the court, "was whether breaches of the contractual agree-
ment to arbitrate caused or threatened to cause irreparable injury to Union
members."' 86 It found that the employer was threatening to discontinue
making premium payments on hospital insurance benefits, which would
cause the policies to lapse; therefore, injunctive relief was necessary to pre-
vent irreparable harm. 187 It cited Greyhound H only for the proposition
that the propriety of a status quo injunction was based on whether "the
party seeking equitable relief could be restored to the status quo ante by
arbitration." 18a8
Consideration of injury and the ability to return to status quo appear to
be the dominant tests for the denial or issuance of injunctions against em-
ployers. The underlying question, however, remains: What amount and
type of harm will the union be likely to sustain? In United Steelworkers v.
Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Machinery, Inc. 189 a federal district court de-
cided an injunction would issue when jobs would be lost, resulting in a
possible safety hazard to remaining employees. This decision does not
mean that an injunction will necessarily issue in circumstances in which
loss of jobs and wages are involved, particularly not when a showing is
made that an arbitrator's award may be able to compensate for those
losses. 190 Mere inconvenience is not sufficient,' 91 although actions of an
employer that cause a "tremendous disruption" in the lives of the employ-
ees and their families may constitute irreparable injury. 192 Irreparable
harm is immediate injury that is certain and great. 193 Whether that test is
met is determined as a question of fact.
Although courts have focused upon the irreparable injury requirement
in status quo injunctions, the Boys Markets criteria must be met before an
injunction may issue.' 94 Should the union fail to make a showing that it is
ready and willing to arbitrate, or fail to show that the grievance is arbitra-
ble,195 an injunction will not issue. Courts scrutinize closely equitable
184. Id at 122.
185. 598 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1979).
186. Id at 1280.
187. Id
188. Id at 1280 n.19.
189. 319 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
190. Local 764 v. Branch Motor Express Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 2939 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
191. Local 174, Utility Workers Union v. South Pittsburg Water Co., 345 F. Supp. 52
(W.D. Pa. 1972).
192. Technical Office & Professional Workers Union Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345 F.
Supp. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
193. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
194. Lever Bros. v. Chemical Workers Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
195. Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW, 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977).
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principles when confronted with a union request for a Boys Markets in-
junction. Even if a finding of irreparable harm is made, an injunction may
not issue if the court balances the equities in favor of the employer. Thus,
in Communications Workers v. Western Electric Co. ,196 although a court
found loss of employee recall rights that could not be returned through
arbitration to be sufficient irreparable injury, it nonetheless refused to
grant an injunction, balancing the equities in favor of the employer.
An unusual example of balancing the equities occurred in Columbia Ty-
pographical Union 101 v. Evening Star Newspaper Co. 197 The plaintiff-
union contested the right of a newspaper publisher to close its business
during the life of a collective bargaining contract. The issue clearly was
arbitrable under the terms of the contract, which contained a clause al-
lowing for the maintenance of the status quo during the arbitration. Con-
sequently, the union sought injunctive relief to stay the closing, and the
court found irreparable injury: "In this case, if the Star goes out of exist-
ence prior to the arbitrator's decision, the arbitrator will be effectually
handcuffed from remedying the situation."' 98 The court stated that the
employer would not be hurt anymore than it had been previously during
the life of the contract. In addition, the court recognized a "public interest
in diverse viewpoints expressed in the media," and observed that trying to
keep Washington from becoming a "one-paper town" was everyone's
responsibility. 199
The Newspaper Co. analysis is unusual in two respects. First, it looks at
the employer's injury in terms of whether the injunction will increase the
harm to the employer and does not take into account the continuation of
the past injury or the efforts of the employer to curb that harm. Secondly,
it includes within its balancing formula a public interest component.
IV. SYMPATHY STRIKES: THE NEW BATTLEGROUND
The sympathy strike is a work stoppage called by one union for the pur-
pose of supporting another union's strike. The enjoinability of sympathy
strikes where the governing collective bargaining agreement contained no-
strike and mandatory arbitration clauses has troubled the courts and pro-
vided fruits for much litigation since the Boys Markets decision. Courts
have been divided over the question: the Fourth Circuit has held such
strikes enjoinable under Boys Markets,20° whereas the Fifth Circuit has
held them not enjoinable because such strikes were not "over a griev-
ance." 20' The Supreme Court, in 1976, resolved the issue by holding
against the enjoinability of sympathy strikes in Buffalo Forge v. United
196. 430 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
197. 100 L.R.R.M. 2394 (D.D.C. 1978).
198. Id at 2396.
199. Id
200. See, e.g., Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2322, International Bhd. of Electrical
Workers, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).





One of the leading cases prior to Buffalo Forge supporting injunctive
relief against sympathy strikes was NAPA, Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs Local 926.203 In NAPA the district court enjoined the union
from striking when another union, seeking to gain control of a different
plant owned by the employer, began picketing NAPA's plant. Local 926
refused to cross the picket line, arguing its action to be proper because a
provision of its collective bargaining agreement allowed the union to re-
fuse to cross a picket line during a "primary labor dispute. ' '2°4 The com-
pany urged that the dispute was secondary in nature and that the primary-
secondary question was subject to the mandatory arbitration and no-strike
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. The injunction was
granted as within the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.205 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court, relying upon "the
basic premise that the law favors arbitration of labor disputes.
206 It
found the primary-secondary disagreement to be an arbitrable dispute
under the contract and, accordingly, held that the strike was enjoinable
under Boys Markets.
A similar result in Valmac Industries, Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425207
illuminates the policy problems in these cases. An injunction was granted
by the district court, enjoining work stoppage as the result of a picket line,
but the order did not specifically require arbitration. Consequently, the
company refused to arbitrate, asserting that the issue had been decided by
the district court. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit remanded, conditioning
the injunction on the requirement that the issue be arbitrated within ten
days.208 In a footnote, the court contemplated the competing policy
considerations:
We stress the need for promptness. Unless the District Court so con-
ditions its order that arbitration must closely follow the issuance of
the injunction, the economics of the situation rather than the merits of
the dispute may decide the outcome, and the union may have been
unfairly denied its right to engage in authorized activity. Boys Mar-
kets was not intended to permit such a result. 20 9
Representing the opposite view prior to Buffalo Forge is Amstar Corp. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters.210 InAmstar union workers refused to cross a
picket line of workers from a different plant owned by a common em-
ployer whose collective bargaining agreement had expired. The employer
filed suit, seeking a Boys Markets injunction, alleging that the work stop-
pages were in violation of a bargained no-strike clause and that the dispute
202. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
203. 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
204. 502 F.2d at 322.
205. Id at 323.
206. Id.
207. 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975).
208. Id at 268.
209. Id n.10.
210. 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
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was arbitrable. The district court granted the injunction,211 but the Fifth
Circuit reversed, stating that the pivotal question was whether the underly-
ing dispute over which the strike had been called was arbitrable. 212 In
Amstar the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the dispute was not over a griev-
ance that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. "Rather,"
noted the court, "the strike itself precipitated the dispute-the validity
under the Union's no-strike obligation of the member-employees honoring
the. . . picket line."' 213 The court stated that if an injunction were to issue
when the legality of the strike itself was the issue, it would be "difficult to
conceive of any strike which could not be so enjoined. ' 214 To issue an
injunction in this type of case would broaden the "narrow" Boys Markets
injunction beyond its permissible scope.
With these conflicting holdings, the stage was set for the Supreme Court
to decide Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers.215 In Buffalo Forge an em-
ployer's office and clerical-technical (O&T) employees struck and picketed
the employer's plants. The production and maintenance employees
honored the O&T picket lines. The employer filed a section 301 action,
claiming that the work stoppage violated the no-strike clause and that the
dispute was arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement. The dis-
trict court refused to grant an injunction because the strike was not an
arbitrable grievance and not within the Boys Markets exception to the
Norris-La Guardia Act.216
The Second Circuit agreed that the strike was "not over a grievance" but
"instead is a manifestation of the striking workers' deference to other em-
ployees' picket lines."' 217 It considered the distinction "crucial" in light of
the need to accommodate Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley. The court,
using the Amstar reasoning, stated "[i]f a strike not seeking redress of any
grievance is enjoinable then the policy of Norris-LaGuardia is virtually
obliterated. ' 218 The court argued further that allowing an injunction
would be to repeal judicially section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. 21 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit in a five-to-four deci-
sion. Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that Boys Markets
"plainly does not control, ' 220 because the strike was not over a dispute
between the employer and the union that was "even remotely subject to
the arbitration provisions of the contract." 22' In the words of the Court:
The strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support of sister unions
negotiating with the employer; neither its causes nor the issue under-
211. 337 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. La. 1972).
212. 468 F.2d at 1372.
213. Id at 1373.
214. Id
215. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
216. 386 F. Supp. 405, 409 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
217. 517 F.2d 1207, 1210 (2d Cir. 1975).
218. Id
219. Id at 1211.




lying it were subject to the settlement procedures provided by the con-
tracts between the employer and respondents. The strike had neither
the purpose nor the effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbi-
trate or of depriving the employer of its bargain. 222
The Court stated that the holding in Boys Markets was justified to imple-
ment the strong congressional preference for dispute settlement in a
method agreed upon by the parties. 223 Boys Markets, according to the
Court, should be extended only so far as necessary to accommodate section
4 of Norris-LaGuardia and section 301 of Taft-Hartley. 224 In effect, it was
to insure that the parties got what they bargained for. They did not bar-
gain for judicial intervention; if they had, such a bargain would have ap-
peared in the collective bargaining agreement. 225
The Court also echoed the Second Circuit's fear that if an injunction
could issue when the question was whether a sympathy strike violated a
no-strike clause, then almost any strike would be enjoinable. This would,
the Court believed,
cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and make the
courts potential participants in a wide range of arbitrable disputes
under the many existing and future collective-bargaining contracts,
not just for the purpose of enforcing promises to arbitrate, which was
the limit of Boys Markets, but for the purposes of preliminarily deal-
ing with the merits of the factual and legal issues that are subjects for
the arbitrator .... 226
The Court evidenced a great fear that this further step would embroil the
district courts in massive injunction litigation and allow them to intrude on
factual issues that should be decided by arbitration. 227 The Court could
not see how such a result would further national labor policy; rather, it
would frustrate it by usurping the function of the arbitrator.
As one might expect, a vigorous dissent took issue with the majority.
Justice Stevens argued that Boys Markets protects the arbitration process.
The Court may enjoin a contractually arbitrable grievance only if the issue
is arbitrable and the strike violates the agreement, considering ordinary
equitable principles.228 Removal of the injunction to enforce the no-strike
clause removes the incentive to arbitrate, as the employer's primary con-
cern is uninterrupted production.229 Thus, injunctive relief furthers, and
may be essential to, the national policy in favor of arbitration. In response
to the union's first argument that under Boys Markets only the arbitrator
may interpret a collective bargaining agreement, 230 Justice Stevens coun-
tered that a court's interim determination that a dispute was not arbitrable
222. Id at 407-08.
223. Id at 407.
224. Id at 411.
225. Id at 410.
226. Id
227. Id at 412.
228. Id at 424.
229. Id
230. Id at 427.
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would not usurp the arbitrator's role.23 ' Justice Stevens reasoned that
"[b]y definition, issuance of an injunction pending the arbitrator's decision
does not supplant a decision that he otherwise would have made." 232 Re-
sponding to the union's second argument that the right to strike will be
deprived prematurely by an interim injunction,233 Justice Stevens main-
tained that a denial of an injunction in this situation might be "just as
devastating to an employer as the issuance of an injunction may [be] to the
union when the strike does not violate the agreement. ' 234 Finally, in re-
sponse to the union's third argument that the purpose of Norris-LaGuar-
dia was to eliminate the risks of enjoining a lawful strike,235 Justice
Stevens argued that not all risks of erroneous injunctions are "immunized"
by the Act.236 He noted that Boys Markets and Gateway Coal each im-
posed injunctive risks against unions.237
The above conclusions notwithstanding, the dissent conceded that sym-
pathy strikes should not always be enjoined temporarily just because a no-
strike clause and an arbitration clause appear in a bargained contract.238
Due to the risk that federal judges may misinterpret labor contracts or
otherwise usurp the arbitrator's role in interpreting the contract, Stevens
set forth four conditions that should govern a judge's contemplated issu-
ance of an injunction, including: (1) whether the union had an opportu-
nity to advance its interpretation of the agreement before the judge;239 (2)
whether the strike is "clearly" in violation of the no-strike clause;240 (3)
whether the parties have submitted the issue to the agreed-upon grievance
procedure;24' and (4) whether the "normal conditions of equitable relief'
under Boys Markets are met.242
The result in Buffalo Forge is somewhat surprising. One would think,
given the developments in case law from Lincoln Mills and the Steelwork-
ers trilogy to Boys Markets and Gateway Coal, that the decision would
have been contrary. The Supreme Court had been consistent in its insis-
tence on the settling of industrial disputes without the use of the strike
whenever possible. Buffalo Forge, however, represents a departure from
that policy, focusing instead on the nature of underlying disputes between
an employer and a union, or the absence of such a dispute, and whether it
is covered by the collectively bargained contract. The lower courts appear
to be seizing on this principle to construe narrowly the impact of Buffalo
Forge.
231. Id at 428.
232. Id
233. Id at 427.
234. Id. at 428.
235. Id at 427.
236. Id at 430.
237. Id
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In Zeigler Coal v. Local 1870, UMW,2 4 3 an employer was attempting to
obtain a civil contempt order against a union for violation of a Boys Mar-
kets injunction against striking over arbitrable matters. The union had
refused to cross another union's picket line; the employer urged that this
was an issue subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agree-
ment allowing for arbitration "of any local trouble of any kind arising at
the mine."'244 The Seventh Circuit held that the union was engaging in a
sympathy strike and was not striking "over" any arbitrable dispute.2 45
The court, however, noted that an injunction might be proper if the union
adopted for its own the grievance of its sister union.246
In Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW 247 the Fourth Circuit held that despite Buf-
falo Forge, sympathy strikes may be enjoined when they are used to com-
pel the employer to concede to an arbitrable issue. Additionally, a dispute
that begins over a nonarbitrable issue may, in some circumstances, be
transformed into an arbitrable issue. The Sixth Circuit held in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis248 that such a strike once transformed no longer
falls under the Buffalo Forge umbrella, and is enjoinable. Thus, where the
work stoppage began over a nonarbitrable issue that later was resolved,
but the strike continued over amnesty, clearly an arbitrable issue, an in-
junction will be upheld. 249
The union also may waive its right to engage in a sympathy strike. Such
a waiver was upheld by the Eighth Circuit in Iowa BeeProcessors, Inc. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters.250 In this case, the no-strike clause was ex-
tremely broad, declaring that there would be "no strike, stoppage . . . on
the part of the union. ' '25 ' In addition, as a supplement, the contract stated
that the union members were "to preserve their normal duties notwith-
standing the existence of any picket line."'252 The court held that Buffalo
Forge did not apply in this case and that an injunction, therefore, could
issue. The decision may be compared with the approach of the National
Labor Relations Board, which requires that the contract show a "clear and
unmistakable" 253 intent to cover sympathy strikes.
Admittedly, these cases pose unusual instances. The brunt of sympathy
strike cases will follow Buffalo Forge and disallow an injunction. Never-
theless, the method of analysis should be consistent no matter what the
outcome. 254 Courts seem to focus upon the contents of a contract rather
243. 566 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1977).
244. Id at 583.
245. Id at 585.
246. Id
247. 560 F.2d 1153, 1172 (4th Cir. 1977). This was a consolidation of several cases.
248. 103 L.R.R.M. 2722 (6th Cir. 1980).
249. Id at 2725.
250. 101 L.R.R.M. 2235 (8th Cir. 1979).
251. Id at 2239.
252. Id (emphasis added).
253. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. & Boilermakers Local 351, 102 L.R.R.M. 1311 (N.L.R.B.
1979).
254. E.g., Design & Mfg. Corp. v. International Union, UAW, 608 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir.
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than the national policy favoring arbitration. If the contract makes the
underlying issue arbitrable, or if the contract explicitly bars a sympathy
strike, an injunction should issue. In other cases, it should not. Whether
this analysis will filter into non-sympathy-strike cases remains to be seen.
Greyhound II indicates that it might.255 In Greyhound II the district court
on remand shifted its inquiry in a status quo ante situation from "extent of
injury" to whether an explicit promise not to strike was within the con-
tract. Quite possibly, Buffalo Forge may be read to restrict other Boys
Markets cases as well.
Buffalo Forge represents an almost shocking change in the attitude of
the Supreme Court. Although the majority is correct in asserting that the
facts of Buffalo Forge differ from Boys Markets, this writer questions
whether such a distinction is truly important. In the typical Boys Markets
case the union is striking over an issue that, according to the terms of the
contract, is arbitrable. The injunction compels the union and employer to
resolve their differences in the agreed-upon manner, through arbitration,
and compels the union to adhere to its no-strike promise. In a Buffalo
Forge case a sympathy strike issue over which the strike occurred is almost
certainly not arbitrable, but the issue of whether the no-strike provision of
the collective bargaining agreement prohibits the sympathy strike remains.
Most probably, this is an arbitrable issue and compelling a union to honor
its no-strike pledge during the resolution of the issue would seem to be a
simple step. The underlying policies are, or should be, the same because
the union and employer have agreed to settle their differences through ar-
bitration rather than by strike. This ensures no interruption in wages for
employees and in production for the employer, and comports with the
strong national policy toward the settlement of disputes through arbitra-
tion. This writer does not believe that to decide otherwise will allow un-
due intrusion on the merits of the case by federal district courts, especially
if the guidelines of the dissent were followed. Like Sinclair, Buffalo Forge
is wrong and should be reconsidered.
V. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN Boys MARKETS CASES
In addition to the applicability of traditional equitable principles in Boys
Markets cases, courts require adherence to the procedural provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In United States Steel Corp. v. UMW 256 Boys
Markets was alleged to prohibit the use of the procedural requirements of
Norris-LaGuardia. The Third Circuit rejected this contention, stating that
the only portion of Norris-LaGuardia rendered inapplicable by Boys Mar-
kets was the express prohibition against specific injunctions contained in
1979), in which the court held that the strike was the subject of the parties' dispute and
dissolved the injunction.
255. See text accompanying notes 175-81 supra.
256. 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1972).
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section 4 of the Act,25 7 insofar as they would bar injunctions necessary to
accomplish the purposes of Taft-Hartley. 258 In other instances, the proce-
dural provisions of Norris-LaGuardia remain applicable in Boys Markets
cases, so long as they do not conflict with, and may be accommodated
with, Taft-Hartley. 259 The court in United States Steel provided an exam-
ple of how the accommodation may be accomplished in its treatment of
section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia. 260 Section 7 prohibits the allowance of an
injunction growing out of a labor dispute: "except after hearing the testi-
mony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination)
in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testi-
mony in opposition thereto, if offered . . . . Such hearing shall be held
after due and personal notice. '' 26 ' The court noted that unlike section 4,
section 7 was a procedural section, which may be followed without con-
flicting with Taft-Hartley. 262 Thus, the requirements of a verified com-
plaint and notice and a hearing in open court were held not to conflict with
the policies of Taft-Hartley: "Indeed," stated the court, "Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(a) requires as much in any event. '263
Both rule 65264 and section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia set forth notice and
hearing requirements that must be met prior to the issuance of an injunc-
tion. Failure to meet these requirements will lead to a reversal of the in-
257. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976). Section 4 prohibits injunctions against the following
activities:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of such undertaking or promise as is de-
scribed in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or
interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insur-
ance, or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in
any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any
action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method
not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advisin or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts
heretofore specified;
(h) A~reeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts hereto-
fore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or
promise as is described in section 103 of this title.
258. 456 F.2d at 487.
259. Id
260. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
261. Id
262. 456 F.2d at 487.
263. Id This was not true at the time of passage of Norris-LaGuardia, since the federal
rules had not been enacted.
264. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
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junction.265 Rule 65(b) allows an ex parte temporary restraining order
(TRO) only under certain conditions, among them when "immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant. ' 266 Section
7 requires that the complaint allege that "a substantial and irreparable in-
jury to complainant's property will be unavoidable" before a TRO will be
granted without notice and hearing to the defendant.
The existence of these varying standards prompted an accommodation
of the two in Celotex Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Interna-
tional Union (Celotex I).267 In this case, the federal district court required
the complaint to state that plaintiffs property would be physically harmed
unless a TRO without notice268 was issued, as required by section 7 of
Norris-LaGuardia. Mere allegation of loss of profits and business would
not suffice. 269 The court found this test satisfied because the complaint
alleged that the plant's pipes would freeze, thus creating a risk of fire if
they drained, and a possible shutdown of the Pennsylvania plant in Febru-
265. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
266. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) states:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral no-
tice to the adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the
adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the appli-
cant's attorney certifies to court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been
made to give the notice and the reasons supporting his claim that notice
should not be required. Every temporary restraining order granted without
notice shall be indorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed
forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record; shall define the injury and
state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and
shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as
the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown,
is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the order is
directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for
the extension shall be entered of record. In case a temporary restraining order
is granted without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set
down for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence of all mat-
ters except older matters of the same character; and when the motion comes
on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall
proceed with the application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does not
do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2 days'
notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order without no-
tice or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the
adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification and in that
event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expedi-
tiously as the ends of justice require.
267. 377 F. Supp. 750 (M.D. Pa. 1974), rey'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 242 (3d Cir.
1975).
268. Although a discussion of the type and quality of notice required is beyond the scope
of this paper, since it is governed by general principles of law, not peculiar to Boys Markets
cases, it is interesting to note that in this case a 1:00 p.m. phone call to the union office for a
5:00 p.m. hearing was held by the court to be insufficient notice, since it did not give the
defendants time to prepare for the hearing and did not give notice to all defendants. There-
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ary. The Third Circuit considered these issues on appeal 270 and agreed at
first with the district court that in a Boys Markets case, where a TRO is
requested, a court may in a proper instance grant the motion without no-
tice and hearing to the defendant.27' Nevertheless, the appellate court re-
versed the result because it agreed with the union that the complaint did
not allege such "substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's prop-
erty" 272 to justify a TRO under section 7. Interestingly, although the
Third Circuit disagreed with the result of the district court, it did not dis-
approve the section 7 "injury to property" test.273
The Third Circuit set out another procedural prerequisite to the issuance
of a TRO, found in the first sentence of rule 65(b). This sentence man-
dates that the applicant's attorney certify to the court the "efforts, if any,
which have been made to give notice" and also the "reasons supporting his
claim that notice should not be required. ' 274 Although this requirement is
not mentioned in section 7, the court found no direct conflict with it in
either Norris-LaGuardia or Taft-Hartley, and no overriding policy reason
for not honoring it. Thus, no accommodation was necessary.275
Another portion of section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia that has been ex-
pressly held to apply to Boys Markets cases is the requirement of an under-
taking for loss, expense, or damage caused by the wrongful issuance of an
injunction. This undertaking was not clear until United States Steel,276 as
rule 65(a) imposes no attorneys' fees requirement while section 7 of Nor-
ris-LaGuardia does. Once again an accommodation was necessary. The
Third Circuit in United States Steel found no strong policy within the fed-
eral rules against the attorneys' fees requirement and, therefore, saw no
reason to deprive the union of its normal protection against attorneys' fees
under section 7.277
Section 9 of Norris-LaGuardia 278 requires that findings of fact set out in
section 7279 be made and filed by the court prior to the issuance of an
injunction. In Boys Markets cases, courts have required compliance with
section 9, although not in absolute terms.280 Clearly, the finding require-
ment of section 7(e), "[tJhat the public officers charged with the duty to
protect complainant's [sic] are unable or unwilling to furnish protec-
270. Celotex Corp., Pittston Plant, Harding, Pa. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union (Celotex II), 516 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1975).
271. Id at 247.
272. Id
273. Id
274. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
275. The Third Circuit found "substantial compliance" with this requirement, although
it appears that the party did not track the literal requirements of the rule. The best policy, of
course, would be to track the rule. 516 F.2d at 247.
276. 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1972).
277. Id at 488; accord, Celotex Corp., Pittston Plant, Harding, Pa. v. Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union (Celotex II), 516 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1975).
278. 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1976).
279. See text accompanying note 261 supra.
280. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483, 488 (3d Cir. 1972);
Texaco Independent Union v. Texaco, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
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tion,'28 is not appropriate in a Boys Markets case. Some indication exists,
though, that additional findings required by section 7 may not be required
if they are not appropriate. 282 The Boys Markets criteria, however, must
be found in the court order. Failure to so include could result in the over-
turning of the injunction.28 3
The sufficiency of findings issue also was treated in Celotex IJ.284 The
union argued that the failure of the injunction to make a finding that the
dispute was arbitrable was fatal. The Third Circuit considered this omis-
sion "harmless," as the union had conceded this issue at every step in the
proceedings. 285 This writer, however, believes a specific finding upon the
arbitrability of the underlying dispute within a TRO to be essential. Such
an omission in a case with facts not exactly the same as Celotex II may
result in bond forfeiture. The court in Celotex II raised another issue that
is quite important procedurally. The TRO was issued for a ten-day period
in compliance with rule 65(b). 286 Section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia permits
an ex parte TRO for five days duration only. The court found no reason
why the five-day requirement should not apply in section 301 actions.287
Celotex II offers the only authority on the five-day, ten-day controversy,
so the requirement is far from settled. The existence of Celotex II, how-
ever, should cause the cautious counsel attempting to obtain an ex parte
TRO to think carefully before asking that it be issued for a period beyond
five days.
The procedural requirements of a Boys Markets injunction are by no
means settled. Indeed, in a dictum the Sixth Circuit has called section 7
arguably not applicable to Boys Markets injunctions,288 as the Supreme
Court expressly reserved review of this issue. Failure to comply with pro-
cedural requirements, however, may well constitute "wrongful issuance"
and allow the forfeiture of an injunction bond.289 Something more than
mere noncompliance is required. In Celotex II the Third Circuit failed to
forfeit the bond despite procedural deficiencies. It held that the TRO, al-
though wrongfully issued, had not harmed the union and, therefore, al-
lowed no recovery on the bond.290
The bond is conditioned upon the finding by a court that an injunction
was improvidently or erroneously issued, or in the following circum-
stances: "where the Court did not hold a proper hearing or failed to make
281. 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1976).
282. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, 520 F.2d 1220
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976).
283. Id
284. 516 F.2d at 248.
285. Id
286. Rule 65(b) is set out at note 266 supra.
287. 516 F.2d at 248. The Supreme Court expressly reserved review of this issue in
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 445 n.19
(1974).
288. United States v. Cunningham, 500 F.2d 120, 126 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979).
289. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1972).
290. 516 F.2d at 249.
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the factual determinations mandated by Part V of the Boys Markets opin-
ion or where the Court erroneously issued a preliminary injunction over
labor disputes not covered by the contract grievance-arbitration provi-
sion."29' The bond is not conditioned on a victory on the merits at arbitra-
tion by the party seeking the injunction. Instead, a hindsight approach is
used to see if it was proper at the time of issuance. Recoverable damages
under the bond are "those that are directly attributable to the restraining
order or injunction. . . as a result of the wrongful restraint"2 92 and do not
include any damages as a result of a suit independent of the injunction.
Bonds are often quite large, especially when much is at stake financially.
293
This is not surprising because the bonds are based on attorney's fees and
potential lost profits or lost wages.
An interesting question concerning the remedy of the aggrieved party
was considered in Associated General Contractors v. Illinois Conference of
Teamsters.294 Although the union requested a $10,000 bond, no formal
motion to that effect was filed, and a $1,000 bond was posted by the em-
ployer. The Seventh Circuit considered the union's remedies for wrongful
issuance where the bond was inadequate. It first stated that the express
language of section 7 of Norris-La Guardia does not authorize any recov-
ery in excess of the amount of an injunction bond; thus, none may be had
under the statute. The statute does not, however, preclude the aggrieved
party from pursuing its ordinary remedy "by suit at law or equity" 295 for
wrongful issuance. The two actions are separate and may be pursued
independently. 296
Another argument addressed by the Third Circuit in Celotex II con-
cerned the section 7 requirement of live testimony of witnesses in open
court before a TRO may issue. The court acknowledged that section 7
does so provide but noted that rule 65(b) would permit reliance upon affi-
davits or a verified petition. The court found here a situation "where ac-
commodation between Section 301 and Section 7, rather than rigid
application of the latter is appropriate. ' 297 Upon some issues, "such as the
existence of contractual relationship relied upon," or where the no-strike
clause would be so that "there cannot really be any dispute that a work
291. Transit Union Div. 134 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound I), 529 F.2d 1073,
1079 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), rev'd, 550 F.2d
1237 (9th Cir. 1977).
292. Id (quoting 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65. 10[1], at 65-96 to -97
(1980)).
293. In Lever Bros. v. Chemical Workers Local 217, 559 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1976),
the bond was $60,000, the highest that this writer has encountered.
294. 486 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1973).
295. Id at 975.
296. Note, however, that an action outside the bond is akin to the tort of malicious prose-
cution; it is not an action for costs and attorney's fees. So, if the bond is not sufficient, the
aggrieved party may have no remedy for its costs and attorney's fees in excess of the bond.
See National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 411 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
297. 516 F.2d at 247.
[Vol. 35
BOYS MARKETS INJUNCTIONS
stoppage violates the collective bargaining agreement, '298 live testimony
will not aid the trier of fact. In contrast, the complaint may "paint a pic-
ture of potential harm more exaggerated than would appear from live tes-
timony before the Court, ' 299 so that the issue of arbitrability may be in
doubt. 3°° In these cases requiring live testimony will be appropriate. 30'
Providing more procedural pitfalls for the unwary injunction-seeker are
the related problems of specificity within the order and contempt. Section
9 of Norris-LaGuardia30 2 requires that the injunction order may enjoin
only "such specific act or acts expressly complained of in the bill of com-
plaint or petition in such a case." Where no specific act is complained of
in the petition or prohibited in the injunction, the injunction is invalid.303
Rule 65(d) requires that the terms of the order be "specific," and "describe
in reasonable detail. . . the act or acts sought to be restrained. '' 304 Any
ambiguity in the order is resolved in favor of the person against whom it is
issued,305 and simply tracking the language of the collective bargaining
agreement may not suffice.3°6 In this instance, both section 7 and rule
65(d) must be honored. This probably reflects the court's sensitivity to due
process considerations.
An injunction order also must meet these specificity requirements in or-
der to provide the notice required before a violator may be held in con-
tempt.30 7 Assuming the order meets the specificity standards, a contempt
citation may issue for failure to comply with the order even if it was
wrongfully issued and later overturned. 308 The order must be obeyed until
overturned or dissolved. This is true for both civil and criminal
contempt.3 9
Although not an area presenting any problems peculiar to Boys Markets
cases, the subject of the appeal of the injunction merits some discussion.
Generally no appeal will be allowed, except from a final judgment.310 A
TRO and temporary injunction will fail to meet this test in almost all
cases, but in many cases a permanent injunction will not.31' Federal laws
298. Id
299. Id at 247-48.
300. Id
301. In Celotex II the court evidences a strong preference for live testimony. 516 F.2d at
248. This is as a result of § 7. It follows then that live testimony will almost always be
required in the case of a preliminary injunction. However, in at least one case, the use of
"voluminous affidavits" was upheld where the court felt the issues were not subject to
"greater elucidation" by live testimony, and where arguably there was a waiver. Drywall
Tapers, Inc. v. Operative Paperers, 537 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1976).
302. 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1976).
303. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975).
304. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
305. New York Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 445 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1971).
306. 519 F.2d at 1246.
307. Developments in the Law- Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1064-67 (1965). -
308. New York Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 445 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1971).
309. United States v. Cunningham, 500 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1979).
310. See Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basisfor Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
311. Developments in the Law, supra note 307, at 1072-73.
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provide for interlocutory appeal of the grant or denial of injunctions, 312
and this has generally been held to exclude most TRO's. 313 Where, how-
ever, a TRO is maintained for an excessive length of time and takes on the
character of a preliminary injunction, 314 or where time is short and the
order amounts to a final disposition,315 an appeal may be allowed. 316
The Norris-LaGuardia Act also provides for an interlocutory appeal of
an injunction "in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. ''317
The term "labor dispute" is defined in section 13 as "any controversy con-
cerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee. '318 Courts have uniformly held that the term "labor dis-
pute" must be broadly and liberally construed. 319 It certainly includes any
dispute in the Boys Markets context. Courts will scrutinize the record to
determine whether the requirements of Norris-LaGuardia have been
met.320 Section 10 allows appeal of temporary and permanent injunctions,
but not TROs.321 Also under this section a TRO apparently may be ap-
pealed if it takes on the characteristics of a temporary injunction.322
VI. CONCLUSION
Early interpretations of the conflict between Norris-LaGuardia and
Taft-Hartley up to Boys Markets and its progeny have provided considera-
ble controversy. From Sinclair to Boys Markets to Buffalo Forge and be-
yond, the courts have wrestled with competing policy considerations. The
Taft-Hartley policy of settlement of industrial disputes through arbitration
clashes with the older Norris-LaGuardia attitude of protecting unions'
312. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
313. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 368 (1961).
314. Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947). This may no longer be an issue since
indications are that a TRO may only last five days. See note 287 supra and accompanying
text.
315. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850
(1962).
316. Developments in the Law, supra note 307, at 1071.
317. 29 U.S.C. § 110 (1976). Section 110 states:
Whenever any court of the United States shall issue or deny any temporary
injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the court
shall, upon the request of any party to the proceedings and on his filing the
usual bond for costs, forthwith certify as in ordinary cases the record of the
case to the court of appeals for its review. Upon the filing of such record in
the court of appeals, the appeal shall be heard and the temporary injunctive
order affirmed, modified, or set aside with the greatest possible expedition,
giving the proceedings precedence over all other matters except older matters
of the same character.
Id
318. Id § 113.
319. See, e.g., United Elec. Coal Cos. v. Rice, 80 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1935).
320. Cater Constr. Co. v. Nischwitz, Ill F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1940).
321. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. McCarthy, 535 F.2d 189 (lst Cir. 1976).
322. Id at 190.
[Vol. 35
19811 BOYS MARKETS INJUNCTIONS 933
rights to engage in concerted activity. What appeared to be a consistent
emphasis on the former stalled with the appearance of Buffalo Forge.
Whether Buffalo Forge takes the first of many steps backward from the
emphasis on arbitration, whether it simply denotes where the line must be
drawn, or whether it will be overturned like Sinclair, remains to be seen.
In any event, continued controversy is assured.

